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WAGING WAR WITH WAL-MART:  
A CRY FOR CHANGE THREATENS THE FUTURE  
OF INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS 
 
Zachariah J. Lloyd∗ 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wal-Mart, America’s behemoth one-stop-shop, boasts astronomical 
statistics:  two million employees worldwide; $374.5 billion in sales for 
the fiscal year ending January 31, 2008; more than 4,100 locations in the 
United States alone, spanning approximately 600 million square feet of 
retail space; and more than 176 million customers per year.1  Despite 
these staggering figures, “[f]ew efforts illustrate the breadth of Wal-
Mart’s ambitions . . . as much as a nearly decade-long drive to establish 
its own bank.”2 
After a firestorm of criticism from banking industry officials3 and 
∗ Mr. Lloyd is an associate in the securities and commercial litigation group at Perkins 
Coie LLP.  He obtained his J.D. with high honors, Order of the Coif, from the S.J. 
Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah in 2008; B.A. (English Theory) from 
the University of Utah.  The Author thanks Clemens Mueller-Landau, Joseph Loosle 
and Matthew Pierce, as well as the staff of the Utah Law Review, for their invaluable 
efforts in bringing this article to fruition.  The Author also wishes to thank Professor 
Christian A. Johnson for his research assistance and academic insight.  Ultimately, 
however, none of this would have been possible without the love and encouragement 
from the Author’s wife, M.E., and the inspiration of his two daughters, Layla and Alix; 
to them, the Author is eternally indebted. 
 1. Wal-Mart, Inc., Corporate Facts, http://www.walmartfacts.com/FactSheets/ 
3142007_Corporate_Facts.pdf [hereinafter Corporate Facts] (last visited Oct. 26, 2008); 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2008 Annual Report (Form 10-K), http://walmartstores.com/sites 
/AnnualReport/2008/docs/wal_mart_annual_report_2008.pdf, at 2-4 [hereinafter Annu-
al Report]. 
 2. Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at C1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/business/17bank.html. 
 3. See Letter from Camden R. Fine, President and CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of 
Am., to Donald E. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Aug. 18, 2005), at 1, 
212 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
 
 commercial 
worl
 
consumer watchdog groups,4 legislative threats from lawmakers,5 and 
an extended moratorium freezing all Industrial Loan Corporation 
(“ILC”)6 applications by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”),7 Wal-Mart withdrew its most recent attempt to secure a bank 
charter – an ILC8 – on March 16, 2007.9  Despite its lack of success, this 
attempt by the world’s largest retailer to enter the world of banking 
stoked anew the flames of controversy surrounding America’s age-old 
public policy: to keep banking and commercial entities separate. 
Specifically, it highlighted the surge in ILCs and the subsequent brick-
by-brick dismantling of the wall dividing the banking and
ds.10 
Although ILCs have existed with relatively little fanfare for decades 
(and several blue chips already control ILCs of their own),11 Wal-Mart’s 
ILC application created unprecedented opposition; drastic calls for 
legislative action came from nearly every arena to prevent Wal-Mart and 
other giant retailers from controlling a banking institution.  The purpose 
of this Article, therefore, is to chronicle the development of the ILC 
industry and to analyze whether the separation of banking and com-
available at http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/ltr081805.pdf. 
 4. See Dash, supra note 2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. As of March 17, 2004, Utah law was amended to rename the industry from 
Industrial Loan Corporations (ILCs) to Industrial Banks. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-21 
(2006). This article will use the term “ILC” to refer to both Industrial Loan Corpora-
tions and Utah Industrial Banks. 
 7. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Board of Directors order executed by FDIC 
Executive Secretary Robert E. Feldman, FDIC Notice No. 6714-01-P, Moratorium on 
Certain Industrial Loan Company Applications and Notices (July 2006) pt. IV, 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2006/pr06073a.html (imposing a six-
month moratorium, effective through January 31, 2007, on FDIC action “to (i) accept, 
approve, or deny any application for deposit insurance submitted to the FDIC by, or on 
behalf of, any proposed or existing ILC, or (ii) accept, disapprove, or issue a letter of 
intent not to disapprove, any change in bank control notice submitted to the FDIC with 
respect to any ILC”). 
 8. See id. at pt. I (noting that “[w]hile ILCs are ‘banks’ under the FDI Act, [12 
U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2)], they generally are not ‘banks’ under the Bank Holding Company 
Act (BHCA) [12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H)]”). 
 9. See Dash, supra note 2, at C1. 
 10. Karen L. Werner, Community Banks:  Banking Coalition Seeks House Support 
For ILC Compromise After Wal-Mart Request, 85 BANKING REP. 230 (2005). 
 11. See infra Part II.A.1(b). 
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tory pervision to manage the risks inherent in their holding structure. 
 
II.  THE CONTROVERSY 
A.   ILC Overview: From Creation to Expansion to Explosion
merce is a justifiable basis for opposing ILCs.  Part II will address the 
history of the ILC from its creation to its emergence as the banking 
entity of choice for some of the Nation’s largest financial and commer-
cial companies; Wal-Mart’s role in advancing the controversy; and the 
regulatory and legislative responses to large commercial entities seeking 
to control ILCs.  Part III will address the separation of banking and 
commerce as it relates to ILCs.  It will also set forth three different solu-
tions available to Congress, and will discuss the impact that the imple-
mentation of proposed legislation will have on the ILC industry as a 
whole, and on the State of Utah in particular. This Article concludes that 
in the absence of any risk peculiar to commercially-affiliated ILCs, and 
in light of the regulatory success of the FDIC and Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions (“Utah DFI”), a wall of separation should not be 
erected between ILCs and commercial holding companies.  Rather, ILCs 
should continue to receive charters, so long as there is sufficient regula
su
 
1.   ILC Growth and Development 
According to a report by the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO Report”), ILCs are “state-charted financial institutions that 
emerged in the twentieth century to provide consumer credit to low and 
moderate income workers who were generally unable to obtain consu-
mer loans from commercial banks.”12  Although most ILC deposits were 
not insured by the FDIC until the passage of the Garn-St. Germain Act 
of 1982,13 these financial institutions raised capital by issuing 
investment certificates and taking deposits.  The ILCs then used these 
 
 12. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. 05-621, INDUSTRIAL LOAN 
CORPORATIONS:  RECENT ASSET GROWTH AND COMMERCIAL INTEREST HIGHLIGHT 
E
nafter GAO REPORT]. 
). 
DIFFER NCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY 1, available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d05621.pdf [herei
 13. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.
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entities has caused the ILC industry to experience “significant asset 
growth.”15 
C-
insu
spect to ILCs, however, the CEBA excepted from the 
BHC
nitio  “
 
funds to make unsecured, high interest loans to consumers.14  In the last 
ten years, however, an increased interest in owning ILCs by commercia
(a) ILC Statutory Creation and Advantages 
Like other “non-bank” banks that neither accepted demand deposits 
nor made commercial loans,16 ILCs were originally exempted from the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (“BHC Act”)17, which prohibited 
bank holding companies from engaging in insurance, securities under-
writing, or commercial business.18 As a result, many banking institutions 
participated in only one of the permissible activities – accepting demand 
deposits or making commercial loans – to avoid classification and regu-
lation as a “bank” under the BHC Act.  In response to the growing num-
ber of such “non-bank” banks, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (“Federal Reserve Board”) enacted the Competitive 
Equality Banking Act (“CEBA”), redefining the term “bank” under the 
BHC Act to include any FDIC-insured bank.19  The CEBA strengthened 
the BHC Act’s supervisory reach by subjecting all non-excepted FDI
red banks to consolidated supervision20 and by bringing them within 
the scope of the BHC Act’s limitations on bank holding companies.21 
Except for a limited number of qualifying institutions, entities that 
own or control insured depository institutions generally may engage, 
directly or through subsidiaries, only in activities that are financial in 
nature.22  With re
 Act four types of ILCs because they did not fall within the defi-
n of bank”: 
 14. Raymond Natter, The Industrial Loan Corporation Controversy, FIN. SERVICES 
INST. July 2005 ¶ 3. 
 15. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 1, 15. 
 16. Natter, supra note 14. 
 17. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1843 (2006). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at  ¶ 4. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843, 1467a(c) (2006). Grandfathered unitary thrift holding com-
panies are not subject to these activities restrictions.  Limited purpose credit card banks 
are also exempt from the BHC Act.  Id. § 1841(c)(2)(F). 
2008 WAGING WAR WITH WAL-MART 215 
ich the 
(iii) 
 of the CEBA (i.e., August 10, 1987); and 
 a consolidated basis by a federal 
agen
ire funding.27  Additionally, ILCs share 
with
ator of “Visa or MasterCard credit, debit, charge, and business cards.”29  
 
(i) an ILC that does not accept demand deposits wh
depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for pay-
ment to third parties; 
(ii) an ILC that has less than $100 million in total assets; 
an ILC that has not undergone a change in control after the 
date of enactment
(iv) an ILC that does not, directly or through an affiliate, engage 
in any activity in which it was not lawfully engaged as of 
March 5, 1987.23 
Notably, exceptions (i) through (iii) do not require the ILC to have 
been in existence as of a certain date. Thus, a new ILC may be chartered 
in any state that permits such entities and may avoid being subject to the 
BHC Act, provided it meets one of these three exceptions.24  Therefore, 
on one hand these exceptions for ILCs arguably create special super-
visory risks, because an ILC’s parent company and non-banking affiliate 
might not be subject to supervision on
cy such as the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), or the 
National Credit Union Association.25 
ILCs are now “the only federally-insured depository institutions 
with the authority to offer a broad range of banking products and 
services in a holding company structure exempt from the [BHC Act].”26  
Thus, neither the holding company nor its subsidiaries are restricted in 
any way as to the services or products they may offer.  FDIC insurance 
permits ILCs to generate funds through deposits, which are often the 
most cost-effective way to acqu
 FDIC-insured institutions the ability to “export” their home state’s 
usury laws – laws regarding interest and finance charges – regardless of 
where their customers reside.28 
Yet another advantage of ILCs is their ability to become an origin-
 23. Natter, supra note 14, ¶ 5 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H)(i)(I-III), (ii) 
(2006)). 
 24. Id. ¶ 8. 
 25. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 10. 
 26. George Sutton, Industrial Banks, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 178, 179 pt. 
III.A (2002). 
 27. Id. at 180 pt. III.B. 
 28. Id. at 180 pt. III.E. 
 29. Id. at 180 pt. III.F. 
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n is based. As will be addressed below, 
virtually all ILCs established in recent years have been chartered and 
regulated by the
s.”34  ILCs offer a versatile depository charter 
for c
ted with parent 
com
approximately ten percent of . . . assets and deposits.”38 
Each ILC is chartered and regulated by the state banking commissioner 
in the state in which the institutio
 State of Utah.30 
(b) Major Participants in the ILC Market 
In the time since the CEBA’s passing, ILCs have emerged from 
relative obscurity and have grown into an industry with over $212.8 
billion in assets.31  Today, “the typical [ILC] is owned by a parent 
corporation with well established multistate operations.”32  Most ILCs 
offer “specific financial products and services to established customers 
of the parent.”33  Thus, the ILC allows the parent company to “leverage 
existing customer relationships” and drive more sales “through estab-
lished distribution channel
ompanies that are not permitted to, or that choose not to, become 
subject to the BHC Act.35 
An overview of the ILC industry revealed that of the sixty-one 
existing industrial banks as of August 2006, forty-three were either 
independently owned or affiliated with a parent company whose primary 
business purpose is financial in nature.36  Further, these forty-three char-
ters comprised approximately ninety percent of the industry’s assets and 
deposits.37  The other eighteen charters were “associa
panies that can be considered non-financial . . . [and] account for 
 
 30. Id. at 179 pt. II. 
 31. See H.R. REP. NO. 110–155, at 10 (2007).  In 1987, the largest ILC had total 
assets of $410 million.  Id.  By 2006, the largest ILC had total assets of $67 billion with 
he twenty largest [FDIC] insured banks in 
osits.”  Id. 
on, supra note 26, at 179 pt. II. 
ns 
 Association of Financial Services, 3 (Aug. 25, 2006), available at http:// 
h.gov/PDFiles/IB%20Speech%202006.pdf [hereinafter Leary Remarks]. 
$54 billion in deposits, “making it among t
terms of dep
 32. Sutt
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
 36. G. Edward Leary, Remarks of the Utah Commissioner of Financial Institutio
before Utah
www.dfi.uta
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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ly support the 
hold
 
Active ILCs that are not independently owned39 can be categorized 
into three distinct business groups.  The first group comprises the major-
ity of the active ILCs; they are owned and operated by large and “comp-
lex financial institutions with extensive access to the capital markets.”40  
These ILCs – such as American Express Centurion Bank ($23.4 billion) 
and UBS Bank USA ($23.1 billion) – use the ILC entity to service their 
brokerage accounts and make securities-backed loans.41  The second 
group, comprised of commercial and retail corporations such as GMAC 
Automotive Bank ($23.5 billion), Target Corporation ($15.3 million), 
and GE Capital Financial ($2.2 billion),42 utilize the ILC as a “financial 
arm of larger corporate organization[s]” in order to enhance their retail 
operations.43  The third group, including BMW ($2.4 billion) and 
Volkswagen ($288 million),44 employs the ILC to “direct
ing company organizations’ commercial activities.”45 
The variety of ILC business models highlights the ILC’s flexible 
utility.  Generally, only three particular assets are needed to enter the 
financial services market – capital, information technology, and distribu-
tion.  It is logical, therefore, that most commercial entities with these 
assets in hand would gravitate toward the opportunities afforded by the 
ILC.  As Ross & Sutton observed, “[e]ach company tends to market 
specialized [financial] products to [its] national and international mar-
kets.”46  These products may include “general consumer credit cards, 
business credit cards, [and] affinity group and private label cards [as 
 39. The GAO REPORT notes that there are a few ILCs which are “community-
st ILCs, these function 
ike traditional community banking institutions.  Id. 
Find Institutions” 
y “Institution Name”) (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
enzi Attachment, supra note 41. 
ions:  A Fresh 
ard and Forward, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 7, 8 (1994). 
focused, stand-alone institutions such as Golden Security Bank and Tustin Community 
Bank.” GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 18.  In contrast to mo
much more l
 40. Id. 
 41. These figures were current as of June 30, 2007. Industrial Loan Companies:  
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong., 16, 
attachment 1 (Oct. 4, 2007) (statement of FDIC Chief Operating Officer John F. 
Bovenzi) [hereinafter Bovenzi Attachment].  For current Utah ILC Asset Statistics from 
the FDIC, see http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/index.asp (follow link for “
and search b
 42. Id. 
 43. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 18. 
 44. Bov
 45. Id. 
 46. Yan M. Ross & George Sutton, Utah Industrial Loan Corporat
Look Backw
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well as] . . me equity 
loans, and auto loans.”47 
on in assets.48  By year-end 2004, twenty-
nine
r exceptions, the Utah Consumer Credit 
Cod
e and its 
finan
 
. small consumer loans, commercial loans . . . , ho
(c) Utah’s Emergence as the ILC Industry Leader 
As of June 30, 1993, the State of Utah regulated fourteen active 
ILCs with just over $1.0 billi
 ILCs were chartered in Utah with assets totaling more than $115.0 
billion.49  These twenty-nine ILCs represented eighty-two percent of the 
ILC industry’s total assets.50 
Utah’s emergence as the ILC industry leader is attributable to three 
primary factors.  First, Utah has desirable usury law.51  Because an ILC 
enjoys the same authority as other FDIC-insured institutions to export 
the interest rate laws of its home state to every other state in which it 
does business, the usury laws of the ILC’s home state are vital.52  As 
Sutton analyzed, “[w]ith mino
e (Title 70C of the Utah Code) does not impose caps on interest 
rates, finance charges, or other fees that a lender and borrower can 
specify in a credit contract.”53 
Second, Utah’s laws are generally business- and institutionally- 
friendly.  Utah businessmen and legislators have collaborated to be on 
the forefront of deregulation of the financial industry, passing laws and 
regulations that foster business and financial development.54  As a result, 
Utah has a regulatory framework that benefits both the stat
cial institutions.  Utah’s state regulators continue to work to enable 
further improvement and expansion of financial industries while main-
taining proper safety and soundness as directed by the FDIC.55 
Third, Utah is a preferred operations site.  Salt Lake City is signifi-
cantly less expensive than other urban areas in terms of operation costs, 
yet approximately eighty percent of the state’s population lives within 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 8. 
 49. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 19. 
on, supra note 26, at 180. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 21. 
 53. Sutt
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
2008 WAGING WAR WITH WAL-MART 219 
acilities of many national and international companies are 
among the highest in those organizations.”57  These factors demonstrate 
why almost all ILCs established in the last decade have been chartered 
in Utah.58
m the 
BHC Act, however, removes these institutions from the Fed’s consoli-
dated supervisory framework n makes up one facet of the 
great controv 60
 
forty miles of the city.56  Additionally, Utah’s “education and literacy 
levels are among the highest in the nation” and “productivity levels in 
the Utah f
 
2.   Regulatory Framework 
Under the BHC Act, the Federal Reserve Board (the “Fed”) 
“generally supervises bank holding companies and has established a 
consolidated supervisory framework for assessing the risks to a deposi-
tory institution that could arise because of their affiliation with other 
entities in a holding company structure.”59  The ILC exemption fro
.  This exemptio
ersy surrounding the continuing existence of ILCs.  
(a) The FDIC 
Exemption from the BHC Act does not remove an ILC from all 
federal regulation.  According to the GAO Report, “[The] FDIC is the 
primary federal supervisor of state-chartered institutions that do not join 
the Federal Reserve system, including ILCs.”61  The FDIC has the same 
broad supervisory, regulatory, and enforcement authority over ILCs as it 
has over other non-member, insured state banks under its jurisdiction.62  
As the GAO Report noted, the “FDIC’s supervisory authority over the 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 180-81. 
 REPORT, supra note 12, at 1. 
Reserve Board to be its primary regulator.  See Sutton, supra 
 supervision of ILCs and the modifications 
 58. See id. 
 59. GAO
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 11.  “As of December 31, 2004, 3 of the top 16 largest insured institutions 
supervised by the FDIC were ILCs.”  Id.  Further, it should be noted that ILCs may 
choose whether to be regulated by the FDIC or Federal Reserve Board; no ILCs in Utah 
have selected the Federal 
note 26, at 179. 
 62. See 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(2) (2006).  See also Mindy West, The FDIC’s Super-
vision of Industrial Loan Companies: A Historical Perspective, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS 
(Div. of Supervision & Consumer Prot. of the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.), Summer 2004, 
at 9-10 (detailing the effectiveness of FDIC
that it has adopted to improve supervision). 
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 consolidated supervisors have over the holding companies and 
affil
rity to examine an 
affil
have resulted in supervisory results comparable to those of the 
consolidated supervisors.69  As Part II will argue, however, more so than 
holding companies and affiliates of ILCs is more limited than the auth-
ority that
iates of banks and thrifts.”63  Further, “[ILCs] are subject to the 
same regulations and regulatory standards as any FDIC-insured 
commercial bank.”64 
Nevertheless, many banking industry leaders and lawmakers are 
critical of the ILC exemption from the BHC Act because they believe 
the FDIC does not have the same coercive power to regulate as the con-
solidated regulators (the Fed or OTS).65  While a consolidated super-
visor is generally able to examine the holding company and any non-
bank subsidiary – notwithstanding any relationship the subsidiary has 
with the affiliated insured bank – the “FDIC’s autho
iate of an insured depository institution is limited to examinations 
necessary to disclose fully the relationship between the institution and 
any affiliate and the effect of the relationship on the institution.”66 
However, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act bolsters the express 
examination power with a statutory grant to the FDIC to “exercise by its 
Board of Directors, or duly authorized officers or agents, all powers . . . 
necessary to carry out the powers so granted.”67  Additionally, in view 
of the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of “incidental powers” in 
the banking context,68 the FDIC has plenary powers that historically 
 
 63. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 6. 
 64. Sutton, supra note 26, at 179. 
 65. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5-7 (expressing skepticism as to the 
FDIC’s ability to supervise effectively a large and complex ILC holding company, 
especially in a time of financial stress); Fine, supra note 3, at 5 (“While the FDIC 
would have the authority and tools to address safety and soundness problems confined 
anies and ensure the safe 
ionsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257-
ly West, supra note 62 at 11-13 (discussing a recent FDIC staff 
to the Wal-Mart ILC, it lacks the essential tools the [BHC Act] gives the Federal 
Reserve [Board] to oversee and supervise bank holding comp
operation of the overall enterprise.”). 
 66. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5-7; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(4)(A) (2006) 
(setting forth the FDIC’s examination authority of affiliates). 
 67. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a) (2006). 
 68. See Nat
58 (1995) (construing “business of banking” language of the National Bank Act broadly 
to permit the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to decide that small banks could 
sell annuities). 
 69. See general
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g proof of the adequacy and sustainability of the 
FDIC’s supervisory powers.70 
(b)  Utah Department of Financial Institutions 
or safe 
and 
these statutory and judicial enhancements, the FDIC’s regulatory track 
record offers convincin
Each ILC is chartered and regulated by the state banking 
commissioner in the state where the institution is based.71  All ILCs in 
Utah are chartered and regulated by the Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions (“Utah DFI”).72  The Utah DFI has robust, plenary authority 
over both its ILCs and the companies that control them under Utah Code 
Title 7.73  Its Commissioner also has broad supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authority over Utah ILCs that parallels the FDIC’s authori-
ty.  The Utah DFI’s supervisory authority includes the right to examine 
the ILC and to take enforcement and remedial actions against the ILC 
and its affiliates.74  Its enforcement powers include: the right to issue 
cease and desist orders;75 remove officers and directors;76 take posses-
sion of the institution;77 and enforce supervisory acquisitions and mer-
gers.78  The Utah DFI’s regulatory power also brings ILCs within the 
scope of “the same laws and regulations, as well as standards f
sound lending practices,” as other Utah commercial banks.79 
The Utah ILC application process closely mirrors that of the FDIC; 
 
study setting forth the FDIC’s excellent track record supervising ILCs and noting that of 
the twenty-one ILCs that have failed, none was either a Utah ILC or owned by a 
o
NDUSTRIAL BANK?, http:// 
h.gov/whatisIB.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
 Remarks, supra note 36, at 5-6 (setting forth 
. §§ 7-1-314, -510 (2008). 
d 
 as its commercial banks.  Id. 
c mmercial entity). 
 70. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 71. See UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., WHAT IS A UTAH I
www.dfi.uta
 72. Id. 
 73. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-201 (2008) (providing that Department of 
Financial Institutions is responsible for “the execution of the laws of this state relating 
to all financial institutions and other persons subject to this title, and relating to the 
businesses they conduct”); see also Leary
the Utah DFI’s examination procedures). 
 74. UTAH CODE ANN
 75. Id. § 7-1-307. 
 76. Id. § 7-1-308. 
 77. Id. § 7-1-510. 
 78. Id. § 7-1-313, -314. 
 79. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 24. The GAO Report also notes that California, 
the other state with any significant concentration of ILC assets, has similarly subjecte
its ILCs to the same standards and regulatory limitations
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 various factors when determining whether to approve applica-
tions for IL ds on 
the busi es
include
• eputation and financial standing of 
• 
• 
s decision making authority and responsi-
• hat is independent of the parent; 
• ose for 
s insulated from the parent company, 
and 
an ILC applicant may thus file the FDIC application in lieu of filing the 
application for the ILC charter with the State of Utah. 80  The Utah DFI 
considers
C charters.  The weight accorded to each factor depen
n s model of each ILC applicant.81  Some of these factors 
: 
The character, r
the organizer(s). 
Whether the organizers have the capital resources to 
support an ILC. 
The establishment of a Utah organization in which 
autonomou
bilities reside with the board and management such 
that they are in control of the ILC’s activities and 
direction. 
• Utah-based management that has knowledge, exper-
tise and experience in operating a depository institu-
tion in a regulated environment. 
Management t
however, goals and policies attributed to the parent 
may be carried out by the ILC if defined in the ILC’s 
business plan. 
A bona fide business plan and defined purp
the existence of the ILC, including deposit taking as 
an integral component, with at least three years of 
pro forma projections and supporting data.82 
Imposition of these factors by the regulator is meant to ensure that 
each ILC has sufficient autonomy, i
is “held accountable for ensuring that all bank operations and busi-
ness functions are performed in compliance with banking regulations 
and in a safe and sound manner.”83 
In addition to the initial review conducted before the approval of a 
depository charter – and as with all depository institutions – ILCs are 
subject to safety and soundness examinations by the Utah DFI and the 
 
 80. See UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 71. 
t, supra note 62, at 9. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Wes
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 Utah.”86  Propelled by this regulatory framework and 
the exceptions under the BHC Act, ILCs have grown out of relative 
obscurity to inclu y largest FDIC-
insured banks.87 
FDIC.84  These annual examinations are usually conducted jointly by the 
two regulators.85  The Utah DFI has over forty-two field examiners who 
are experienced in conducting regular examinations of holding compa-
nies, and it plans “to provide further training and increase [its] number 
[of examiners] so that [it] can conduct, independently, if need be, 
holding company inspections of all financial institution holding compa-
nies registered in
de among their ranks one of the twent
B.  Wal-Mart’s Efforts to own a Bank 
Sam Walton opened his first discount store in 1962.   Over the 
ensuing forty-six fiscal years, Wal-Mart’s corporate footprint permeated 
communities in every state and thirteen countries worldwide to include 
1,589 discount stores, 2,794 Supercenters, 713 Sam’s Clubs, and 134 
Neighborhood Markets.   Its 1.4 million American employees make it 
the nation’s 
88
89
largest employer and it sits atop the Fortune 500.90  Yet, 
despite its remarkable growth and repeated efforts, Wal-Mart has been 
unable to accomplish a prim banking 
insti
Wal-Mart commenced its quest to own a bank in June 1999 when it 
ary objective – to acquire its own 
tution. 
1.  Past Attempts 
 
 84. UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 71. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Leary Remarks, supra note 36, at 6.  Additionally, Commissioner Leary stated 
that “Utah is participating with the FDIC in the Large Bank Supervision Program for 
four [ILCs]” and “[t]he supervision of these large banks is coordinated by a full-time 
relationship manager for [Utah] as well as the FDIC.”  Id.  These examiners instigate a 
at usually “involves three targeted 
ard.”  Id. 
07). 
bank-specific regulatory and supervisory plan th
reviews that roll-up to an annual Examination Report that is reviewed with [both ILC] 
management and the bo
 87. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 10 (20
 88. See Wal-Mart Stores History, http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/297.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
 89. Annual Report, supra note 1, at 53. 
 90. Corporate Facts, supra note 1; Christopher Tkaczyk, Fortune 500:  The Top 50, 
FORTUNE, Apr. 30, 2007, at 210, available at http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2007/ 
fortune/0704/gallery.500top50.fortune/index.html. 
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 first of many times during the course of Wal-Mart’s quest 
that 
 transactions within those 
bank
 pro-
 
applied to purchase a small thrift in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma named 
the Federal Bank Center.91  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act92 (“Gramm-
Leach”), passed by Congress in November 1999, “blocked this attempt . 
. . by closing the ‘unitary thrift holding company’ loophole93 and 
reaffirming the nation’s policy of separating banking and commerce.”94  
This was the
its efforts to own a bank would be stymied by national legislative 
opposition. 
Wal-Mart’s next attempt to acquire a bank was made in 2001 
through a strategic alliance with Toronto-Dominion Bank USA (“TD 
Bank”) allowing TD Bank to offer its banking services in approximately 
100 Wal-Mart stores.95  Wal-Mart’s plan to share in the bank’s profits, 
however, and to have its associates perform
s, led to the merger’s rejection by OTS because it would “give Wal-
Mart unauthorized control over TD Bank.”96 
Undaunted, Wal-Mart turned its attention to the ILC structure by 
attempting to acquire a small, bankrupt California ILC named Franklin 
Bank in 2002.97  This time the California legislature stepped in by 
passing legislation that prevented “non-financial institutions from ac-
quiring state-chartered [ILCs] unless they are ‘engaged in the activities 
permitted for financial holding companies’ as established by [Gramm-
Leach].”98  California governor Gray Davis stated that he signed the
 91. See Bloomberg News, Wal-Mart Wants To Buy Savings And Loan, N.Y. TIMES, 
unity Banks, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 187, 191 (2006). 
ngly, Congress grandfathered in 
 one savings and loan or thrift institution and was 
. 
g Rob Blackwell, Wal-Mart, TD Venture Hits Regulatory Wall, 
 
art Drops the Other Shoe, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS 
June 30, 1999, at C31; Kevin Nolan, Wal-Mart’s Industrial Loan Company:  The Risk 
to Comm
 92. Pub. L. No. 160-102, 113 Stat.1338 (Nov. 12, 1999) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
1811). 
 93. Nolan, supra note 91, at 191 n.37.  Interesti
exempted thrifts approved before May 4, 1999, a date carefully chosen to exclude an 
application from Wal-Mart.  Id. at 191. 
 94. Id.  A unitary thrift holding company was a holding company owned by a 
commercial company that owned only
thereby exempt from limitations on the nature of the activities conducted by its 
commercial subsidiaries.  Id. at 200
 95. Id. at 191 (citin
AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 1). 
 96. Id. at 191-92.
 97. Id. at 192 (citing Wal-M
WK., July 26, 2005). 
 98. Id.; 2002 Cal. Stat. 1162. 
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hibitive legislation “ n against 
mixing banking and commerce, as intended by [Gramm-Leach].”99 
e 
to a
ta to process an estimated 
sixty
osed Wal-Mart’s application was not that Wal-Mart 
wou
in accordance with the federal prohibitio
2.  The Utah ILC Application 
March 16, 2007 marked the end of the most recent chapter of Wal-
Mart’s historic mission to acquire its own bank.100  The nearly eighteen-
month effort to charter a Utah ILC, which began in July 2005,101 cam
 close when Wal-Mart withdrew its application amidst swelling 
controversy and the extension of an FDIC moratorium102 on all ILC 
applications for FDIC insurance by non-financial institution 
applicants.103 
According to Wal-Mart’s application, its major purpose in 
acquiring a Utah-chartered ILC was to process credit, debit and elec-
tronic check transactions.104  Denis Bouchard, Wal-Mart’s director of 
payments services, said “the bank will serve as an acquirer of credit 
transactions in the Visa and MasterCard systems, and will be a sponsor 
for debit transactions in ACH [Automated Clearing House] trans-
actions.”105  Presently, Wal-Mart uses First Da
 percent of its millions of annual transactions, totaling approxi-
mately $172 billion per year.106  Savings on transactional costs would be 
an estimated $650 million annually.107  Thus, Wal-Mart’s staunch desire 
to charter an ILC is certainly understandable. 
However, the biggest fear of banking industry leaders and law-
makers who opp
ld charter an ILC in order to more cost-efficiently process credit 
transactions, but rather that it likely would have expanded its business 
 
 99. Letter from Gray Davis, Governor, to Members of the C.A. State Assembly 
 author), available at 2002 Cal. ALS 1162 (LEXIS). 
. 
Mart Plan To Set Up Bank, THE 
U  be limited to 
ctronic payments and issuing short-term certificates of deposit to individual 
 nonprofit organizations). 
(Sept. 30, 2002) (on file with
 100. See Dash, supra note 2
 101. Wal-Mart Drops the Other Shoe, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS WK., July 26, 2005. 
 102. See infra note 132. 
 103. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 104. See Josh Gerstein, AFL-CIO Opposes Wal-
N.Y. S N, Aug. 15, 2005, at A1 (stating that Wal-mart’s ILC would
handling ele
investors and
 105. See Wal-Mart Drops the Other Shoe, supra note 101. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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 the FDIC and Utah DFI to expand its business and conduct 
full-
aining any additional 
consent by state officials.114  This relatively easy transition from being a 
limited ILC to having the ability to branch into nearly half of the states 
 
model once the initial three-year period following its charter by the 
FDIC expired.108 
According to federal and Utah law, once an ILC has been estab-
lished and receives FDIC insurance, it is only restricted to its original 
business plan for the first three years of the ILC’s existence.109  After 
three years, an ILC may seek approval for an amendment to its original 
charter from
service banking.110  Thus, it is possible that a Wal-Mart ILC would 
eventually be able to expand its charter beyond merely processing credit 
transactions to engage in any practice of a commercial bank permitted 
by law.111 
If approved, an amendment to Wal-Mart’s ILC charter would allow 
Wal-Mart to immediately open branches in twenty-two states.112  As one 
author summarized, “[f]ive states provide for ILC charters and seventeen 
additional states agreed to the ‘opt-in’ provision under the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994” that authorized recipro-
cal arrangements.113  Thus, banks chartered in one state are permitted to 
branch into all other “opt-in” states without obt
 108. See Fine, supra note 3, at 2-3 (highlighting Wal-Mart’s repeated efforts to enter 
the banking industry as evidence that the likelihood of expansion of its ILC charter is 
quite high). 
 109. Press Release, Paul E. Gillmor, Congressman, Ohio’s Fifth Cong. Dist., 
s
 333.101(b).  
ng as the Wal-Mart ILC is in compli-
i
general character of business and will not 
:  Supercentre Banking, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 
Congre sman Gillmor Requests a Full Investigation of the Wal-Mart Bank Application 
(Sept. 23, 2005), http://www.walmartwatch.com/img/documents/20050923_Gillmor_ 
letter_to_FDIC_Chairman_Powell.doc [hereinafter Gillmor Release]. 
 110. 12 C.F.R. § 333.101(a) (2007). The typical change, which might require the 
prior written consent of the FDIC, would be to exercise trust powers.  Id. §
Yet, an ILC may engage in any practice permitted by law after three years without the 
FDIC’s prior consent if such a change would not be considered a change in the general 
character or type of business of the ILC.  Gillmor Release, supra note 109. 
 111. Gillmor Release, supra note 109.  So lo
ance w th its original business plan with the FDIC for the first three years, it will only 
need to notify the FDIC of its change in the 
need consent.  See 12 C.F.R. 333.101(a) (2007). 
 112. Wal-Mart and Financial Services
2005, at 2; Gillmor Release, supra note 109. 
 113. Nolan, supra note 91, at 190; see 12 U.S.C. 36(g) (2006). 
 114. Nolan, supra note 91, at 190-91. 
2008 WAGING WAR WITH WAL-MART 227 
explai ed to 
the prospect of a Wal-Mart banking institution.115 
s or engage in lending, and the ILC was 
“not
ed 
ns why community banks nationwide were intensely oppos
3.  Bank Branching and Wal-Mart’s Expansive Ambitions 
Before Wal-Mart eventually abandoned its efforts to charter the 
Utah ILC, it stated in a comment to the first FDIC moratorium on all 
ILC applications that it would be willing to accept a charter approved by 
the FDIC that included a ban on branching.116  According to Jane 
Thompson, the President of Wal-Mart Financial Services, Wal-Mart had 
no desire to establish branche
 a bank a consumer [would] ever see.”117  In addition, Thompson 
pointed out that Wal-Mart actively encourages community banks to 
open branches in its stores.118 
Against the backdrop of these comments, however, two critical 
historical trends surrounding Wal-Mart’s development deserve mention-
ing.  First, Wal-Mart already has a long history of branching out into 
markets in which it previously stated it had no interest.119  Second, as 
critics of its ILC charter and business model argue, once Wal-Mart 
enters into new markets it uses “predatory pricing and other techniques 
to run all local competition out of business.”120  Camden Fine, President 
of the Independent Community Bankers of America (“ICBA”), not
 
 115. See Wal-Mart’s Utah ILC Application Running into Flack, ELECTRONICS 
PAYMENTS WK., Nov. 1, 2005; see also Werner, supra note 10, at 230 (documenting 
st, supra note 62, at 10 (citing a list of conditions the FDIC has 
cus on Unbanked, 
0 banks operating more than 1,100 branches in Wal-Mart stores across the 
, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/04/news/companies/walmart_bank/index. 
ug. 17, 2005) available at http://www.icba.org/files/IC 
efforts by a collation of banks to urge Congress to not allow a Wal-Mart bank). 
 116. Comment Submitted by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. to FDIC Request for Comment, 
71 Fed. Reg. 49456 (Aug. 23, 2006).  The FDIC has developed conditions that may be 
imposed when approving deposit insurance applications for institutions that will be 
owned by or significantly involved in transactions with commercial or financial 
companies.  See We
applied in the past). 
 117. Rob Garver, Wal-Mart’s Financial Vision In Retail:  Fo
Partnerships, Home Grown ATMs, AM. BANKER, Oct. 5. 2005, at 5. 
 118. Id.  As of the date of its Utah ILC application, Wal-Mart had arrangements with 
more than 30
country.  Id. 
 119. Shaheen Pasha, Wal-Mart Bank Faces Tough Opposition, CNNMONEY.COM, 
Jan. 4
htm. 
 120. Letter from Sound Banking Coalition to John F. Carter, Reg’l Dir., Fed. 
Deposit Insur. Corp., at 5-6 (A
BASites/PDFs/sbc081705.pdf. 
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ivable to 
do t
revealed that after Wal-Mart’s expansion into Iowa, 555 grocery stores, 
298 hardware stores, 293 building materials stores, and 116 drug stores 
closed their doors.128  Other studies indicate that “for every Wal-Mart 
this checkered past: “Fifteen years ago, Wal-Mart said it had no designs 
on the grocery business and 20 years ago, they said they had no designs 
on the hardware business but now they dominate both businesses.”121 
Evidence of this repetitive cycle surfaced on June 20, 2007 when, 
only months after withdrawing its ILC application and denying inten-
tions of branching banks, Wal-Mart announced plans to open 1,000 
“financial-service centers” by 2009.122  In a partnership with Visa, 
General Electric Co.’s ILC, and the Green Dot automated-teller network, 
customers at 450 Wal-Mart MoneyCenters would be able to cash 
checks, pay bills, and use a prepaid Wal-Mart-brand Visa nationwide.123  
Thus, ICBA President Fine declared, “Wal-Mart wants in to the finan-
cial-services business and they’re going to try every way conce
hat.”124  Further, Steve Verdier, an ICBA lobbyist affirmed, “[i]t 
looks like they’re building the infrastructure for a nationwide network of 
bank branches.”125  Thus, contrary to its recent statements, it seems Wal-
Mart may indeed have intentions of expanding its broad array of in-store 
departments126 to include many banking and financial services. 
Typically, after Wal-Mart expands into another sector of the market 
and reduces local competition – or does away with it entirely – Wal-
Mart frequently increases its own prices.127  The rippling effects of these 
two historical trends are far-reaching.  An Iowa State University study 
 
 121. Pasha, supra note 119. 
 122. Lauren Colman-Lochner, Wal-Mart Will Open 1,000 Financial Centers by 
MBERG, June 20, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news 
 R. Fine, President, Indep. Cmty. Bankers 
al-Mart’s bid to branch into banking, DESERET MORNING 
 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_/ 
COMPETING WITH THE DISCOUNT MASS 
2004), available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/ 
2009, BLOO
archive&sid=a3P.tll8xX1w. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Telephone Interview with Camden
Ass’n, in Salt Lake City, Utah (June 21, 2007). 
 125. Colman-Lochner, supra note 122. 
 126. Wal-Mart is currently the largest grocery retailer in the United States, as well as 
“the nation’s No. 1 retailer of recorded music, DVDs, toys, [and] pet food.”  Mary 
Deibel, Q & A about W
NEWS, May 15, 2006, available at
ai_n16365538. 
 127. Nolan, supra note 91, at 194. 
 128. DR. KENNETH E. STONE, 
MERCHANDISERS, 23 tbl. 2 (Jan. 16, 
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unity 
banking industry “[i]f a Wal-Mart ILC charter is amended to include full 
retail banking s ide.130 
C.  Fal ication
‘Supercenter’ opened, two local groceries will close.”129  Therefore, as 
Nolan concludes, a Wal-Mart ILC could similarly harm the comm
ervices” in each of its Supercenters nationw
lout from Wal-Mart’s Appl  
insurance filed by Wal-
Mar
s to the 
FDIC ur ing industry.134  The FDIC posited 
 
1.  The FDIC Moratoria 
In the first six months following the July 2005 submission of Wal-
Mart’s ILC application, the FDIC received approximately 1,700 letters 
in total, with the majority vehemently opposing Wal-Mart’s ILC appli-
cation.131 By the end of 2006, that number had increased to over 13,800 
comment letters.132  As the letters poured in, members of the House 
Committee on Financial Services requested that the FDIC “defer any 
decision on the application for federal deposit 
t Bank until the [FDIC] Board has its full complement of directors,” 
because of the importance of the application.133 
By the time one year had elapsed following Wal-Mart’s application, 
the ILC controversy was in full bloom.  On July 28, 2006, the FDIC is-
sued a moratorium on all states currently chartering ILCs to block any 
additional applicants from receiving ILC charters, which effectively 
bought some time for the FDIC to assess the risks posed by ILC
 ins ance fund and the bank
faculty/stone/1995_IA_WM_Study.pdf. 
ble at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
z001.htm. 
 Industrial Bank Applications and Notes, 72 Fed. Reg. 
52
 the 
 of [ILCs] by Wal-Mart or other commercial companies. 
ion (Dec. 16, 2005), available at 
l Loan Company Applications and Notices, 71 
 129. Nolan, supra note 91, at 194. 
 130. Id. at 195; see also Anthony Bianco & Wendy Zellner, Is Wal-Mart Too 
Powerful?, BUS. WK., Oct. 6, 2003, at 100, availa
magazine/content/03_40/b3852001_m
 131. Pasha, supra note 119, at 1. 
 132. Moratorium on Certain
90, 5291-92 (Feb. 5, 2007). 
Approximately 12,485 comments were generated by what appears to be organized 
campaigns either supporting or opposing the proposed industrial bank to be owned by 
Wal-Mart or the proposed acquisition of Enerbank, also an [ILC], by The Home 
Depot.  Of this total, approximately 82 percent generally were opposed to
ownership
Id. at 5292. 
 133. Press Release, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 25 Financial Services Committee 
Members Urge FDIC to Wait on Wal-Mart Applicat
https://financialservices.house.gov/pr12162005.html. 
 134. Moratorium on Certain Industria
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twelv s
(iv) 
in the FDIC’s oversight of ILCs in order to protect the 
onsider[ed] how best to respond to 
any safety and sound mmercial ownership 
under existing law.”139
 
e que tions designed to evaluate the following four issues: 
(i) industry developments; 
(ii) the various issues, facts, and arguments raised with respect 
to the ILC industry; 
(iii) whether there are emerging safety and soundness issues or 
policy issues involving ILCs  or other risks to the insurance 
fund; and 
whether statutory, regulatory, or policy changes should be 
made  
deposit insurance fund or important Congressional objec-
tives.135 
At the conclusion of the six-month moratorium, the FDIC’s much-
anticipated decision came in the form of yet another moratorium: a one-
year extension, except this time the stay on applications applied solely to 
those submitted by commercial companies, such as Wal-mart.136  The 
FDIC explained in a statement, “the original moratorium demonstrated 
that the growth of the ILC industry, the trend toward commercial com-
pany ownership of ILCs and the nature of some ILC business models 
have raised significant questions about the risks to the deposit insurance 
fund.”137  In addition, the FDIC announced a proposed regulation that 
would create a framework for the FDIC to make decisions on the ILCs 
owned by financial parents.138  Ultimately, according to the FDIC, the 
moratorium would “provide Congress with an opportunity to address the 
issue legislatively[,] while the FDIC c
ness issues surrounding co
 
2.   Congressional Actions 
Since the passing of Gramm-Leach in 1999, which closed the BHC 
Fed. Reg. 43482, 43483 (Aug. 1, 2006). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Insur. Corp., FDIC Extends Moratorium on ILC 
Applications by Commercial Companies for One Year; Will Move Forward on 
Applications from Financial Companies (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.fdic. 
gov/news/news/press/2007/pr07007.html. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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f its annual gross reve-
nues
 
Act loophole for unitary thrift holding companies, critics have wondered 
why Congress chose to expressly reaffirm the separation of banking and 
commerce while still excluding ILCs from BHC Act supervision.140  The 
Gillmor-Frank Amendment, sponsored by Barney Frank (D-MA) and 
Paul Gillmor (R-OH) in 2005, is representative of the type of changes to 
the ILC industry Congress has considered over the past decade. 141  The 
amendment provided that the benefits of the ILC exception from con-
solidated supervision would not extend to any ILC owned by a parent 
company that receives fifteen percent or more o
 from non-financial activities.142 However, although the amendment 
passed the House, it was never enacted into law. 
While the Gillmor-Frank Amendment failed to gain traction in the 
Senate, the Wal-Mart ILC application had clearly catapulted the ILC 
controversy back into the financial-sector’s spotlight and Congress took 
aim ILCs once again with the Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 
2006.143  While this particular bill did not make it out of committee 
before the end of Congress’s term, a nearly identical version of the bill 
emerged at the commencement of the next congressional session as the 
Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007 (“House Bill 698”).144  
This legislation would require an ILC holding company to register and 
file certain reports with the FDIC within 180 days after becoming an 
ILC holding company.145  House Bill 698 would also prohibit such a 
 140. See Peter E. Heyward & Ronald R. Glancz, GAO Report Contributes to the 
Industrial Loan Company Debate, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 274 (2006), 
available at SL015 ALI-ABA 271, 274 (Westlaw). 
 141. The language of the Gillmor/Frank Amendment passed the House of 
Representatives twice, in the Business Checking Freedom Act of 2005 and the Financial 
Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2005.  See Business Checking Freedom Act of 2005, 
H.R. 1224, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 
2005, H.R. 3505, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). 
 142. See, e.g., H.R. 1224 § 2(b)(3)(B). 
 143. H.R. 5746, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) (amending the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act to establish industrial bank holding company regulation). 
 144. H.R. 698, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).  Congressman Gillmor and Financial 
Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank introduced H.R. 698 on January 29, 2007 
to help restore the wall between banking and commerce and stem the expansion of the 
ILC charter.  Press Release, House Comm. On Fin. Servs., Financial Services 
Committee Overwhelmingly Passes Industrial Bank Holding Company Act (May 2, 
2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/press050 
207.shtml. Similar legislation was introduced in the Senate.  See S. 1356 110th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2007). 
 145. H.R. 698 § 51(c). 
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. . 
will 
 provisions could yet again “increase the attractiveness of 
owning an ILC.”152  This attractiveness would likely further expand the 
ILC industry. 
 
holding company from being controlled by a commercial firm and 
grandfathers in certain institutions to exempt them from its require-
ments.146  Under House Bill 698, a company would be considered 
“commercial” if it derives 15 percent or more of its gross revenue, on a 
consolidated basis, from non-financial activities.147 The House of Repre-
sentatives Report discussing the bill (“House Report”) concluded, how-
ever, that “[t]hose commercial companies that already own [ILCs] . 
be exempt from this prohibition under one of two grandfather 
provisions.”148  House Bill 698 will be addressed further in Part III.B. 
Other legislative proposals that Congress has considered over the 
past few years have taken an expansive rather than restrictive view of 
the ILC industry.  The GAO Report notes that recent “legislative propo-
sals would remove the current prohibition on paying interest on demand 
deposits and, separately, authorize insured depository institutions, 
including most ILCs, to offer interest-bearing business NOW 
accounts.”149  Opponents of ILCs argue this expansion of ILC powers 
“could further blur the distinction between ILCs and traditional 
banks.”150  The GAO Report also highlights another legislative proposal 
that “would allow banks and most ILCs (those included in a grand-
fathered provision) to branch into other states through establishing new 
branches – known as de novo branching – by removing states’ authority 
to prevent them from doing so.”151  Federal Reserve Board officials have 
said that these
 146. H.R. 698 § 51(f)(3). 
 147. H.R. 698 § 51(f)(2). 
 148. H.R. REP. NO. 110-155 at 9 (2007). 
 149. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 76; see H.R. 1224, 109th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (1st 
Sess. 2005). 
 150. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 76. 
 151. Id. at 76; see H.R. 1375, 108th Cong. § 401(b) (2d Sess. 2004).  In response to 
Wal-Mart’s ILC application and the threat of ILCs having the ability to engage in de 
novo branching, several states enacted legislation prohibiting an ILC chartered under 
the law of another state from establishing an office on the premises or property of the 
ILC’s affiliate if that affiliate engages in “commercial” activities.  See, e.g., VA. CODE 
ANN. § 6.1-232.2 (Supp. 2007) (repealed effective Feb. 5, 2007, Acts 2007, c.1, cl. 2). 
 152. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 76. 
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onsidering the competitive effects, potential conflicts of 
inter
ervisor.”   However, as demon-
strat
 
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
In the wealth of comments submitted in response to the FDIC mora-
toria, countless interest groups, corporations, and law and policy makers 
have offered their respective remedies to the ILC controversy.  Many 
have suggested that the FDIC reject ILC applications from commercial 
entities by c
est, or any other policy concerns.153 Yet, ultimately, this policy 
decision falls on the shoulders of Congress, not the FDIC Board of 
Directors.154 
The GAO Report offered three alternative courses of action that 
Congress could pursue in order to address the ILC controversy.155  First, 
the report suggested that Congress could eliminate “the current exclu-
sion for ILCs and their holding companies from consolidated super-
vision.”156  Second, Congress could grant the “FDIC similar 
examination and enforcement authority as a consolidated supervisor.”157  
Third, Congress could leave “the oversight responsibility of small, less 
complex ILCs with the FDIC, and trans[fer] oversight of large, more 
complex ILCs to a consolidated sup 158
ed by the legislative action (or lack thereof) discussed above in Part 
 153. See Fine, supra note 3, at 4-5; see Industrial Loan Companies:  Hearing on 
H.R. 698 before H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. at 2 (1st Sess. 2007) 
(statement of James P. Ghilglieri Jr., Chairman, Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass’n). 
 154. Statement of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Regarding the ILC 
Moratorium Extension at the Meeting of the Fed. Deposit Insur. Corp. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 
31, 2007), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2007-9a.pdf.  The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1815 et seq., sets forth the seven factors the FDIC 
may consider in determining whether to extend insurance to a particular institution.  
These Factors include:  (1) the financial history and condition of the depository 
institution; (2) the adequacy of the institution’s capital structure; (3) the future earnings 
prospects of the institution; (4) the general character and fitness of the management of 
the institution; (5) the risk presented by the institution to the Deposit Insurance Fund; 
(6) the convenience and needs of the community to be served by the institution; and (7) 
whether the institution’s corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of the FDI 
Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (2006). These factors expressly mention nothing as to 
commercial affiliation.  Thus, the only factor where the commercial nature of an 
applying entity might plausibly be considered is the risk presented by the institution to 
the Bank Insurance Fund. 
 155. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 81. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
234 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
ze of the ILC.  The 
legis
ulatory 
entit
g industry as a whole.  Part III.B will then 
focus on the effects of proposed legislation – House Bill 698 and any 
and i
A.  Separation of Banking and Commerce: Does Commercial Affiliation 
II.C.2, it appears that Congress is either unable or unwilling to plausibly 
consider implementation of these alternatives. 
The most drastic legislative reform to the ILC industry would 
undoubtedly be the complete elimination of the ILC exception from the 
BHC Act and consolidated supervision.  Yet, with many of America’s 
largest and most prolific corporations already owning ILCs159 – 
including commercial giants General Electric and General Motors, as 
well as financial services leaders such as Morgan Stanley – complete eli-
mination of the ILC industry is now likely to be out of legislative reach.  
Further, it is also unlikely that ILC supervision would shift between the 
FDIC and one of the other consolidated regulators such as the Federal 
Reserve Board based only on the relative si
lative trail leads toward a compromise between the complete 
elimination of the ILC exception to the BHC Act, on the one hand, and 
unrestricted commercial affiliation, on the other. 
Congress must decide not only the fate and future of ILCs owned 
by commercial entities, but also the proper regulatory structure, 
including both the level of supervision and the federal or state reg
y that can best administer that supervision.  These decisions, how-
ever, will ultimately depend on the weight given to the long-standing 
public policy requiring the separation of banking and commerce. 
Part III.A will address the viability of the argument that ILCs 
affiliated with commercial entities pose special risks to themselves as 
institutions and the bankin
similar bills that may be on the horizon – on the ILC industry as a whole 
n Utah, in particular. 
as Currently Permitted by the ILC Holding Structure Create a 
Measurable Risk to the Banking Industry or Institution Itself? 
The chief criticism of the ILC exception to the BHC Act and 
consolidated supervision is that America is committed to a long-standing 
policy – a form of legislative stare decisis160 – of erecting a wall to 
 
 159. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
 160. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004) (defining stare decisis as “[t]he 
doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial 
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”). 
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eeking to thwart unwanted competition, retreat to relatively 
unqu
en comer-
cial 
cific risks posed to both 
the banking industry and the deposit insurance fund by ILCs generally 
or by commercially-owned ILCs specifically. 
 
separate banking and commerce.  Indeed, Fine has referred to this 
metaphorical wall as the “linchpin of the financial and economic system 
of the United States.”161  Fine further argues that the “walls separating 
banking and commerce prevent conflicts of interest and undue 
concentration of resources, and ensure the impartial allocation of credit 
so vital to economic growth and development and to a safe and sound 
financial system.”162  Yet, just how impenetrable is this wall?  Is it 
erected between banking and all commercial entities, or are there 
particular types of commercial institutions that generate a greater need 
for a distinct division and heightened fortifications? Or, is the separation 
of banking and commerce merely a protectionist partition behind which 
bankers, s
estioned safety from unwanted expansion into the banking 
industry? 
Proponents of the wall posit three central justifications.163  First, 
allowing the banking and commerce spheres to mix might, in effect, 
“lead to an extension of the federal safety net to commercial affiliates 
and make insured banks susceptible to the reputational, operational and 
financial risks of their commercial affiliates.”164  Second, banks affili-
ated with commercial firms may be “less willing to provide credit to the 
competitors of their commercial affiliates or may provide credit to their 
commercial affiliates at preferential rates or on favorable terms.”165  
Third, allowing industrial or financial conglomeration betwe
and banking entities could result in excessive concentration of 
resources, with large companies wielding too much power.166 
What all three arguments lack, however, is any empirical support 
evincing statistically-significant, industry-spe
 161. Fine, supra note 3, at 3. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 71; Industrial Loan Companies:  Hearing 
on H.R. 698 before H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. at 3 (1st Sess. 2007) 
(statement of Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. 
Res. System). 
 164. Kohn, supra note 163, at 7. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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1. Increased Exposure to Reputational, Operational, and 
 Financial Risks of ILC Affiliates 
John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency and member of the 
board of directors of the FDIC, said in a statement regarding the FDIC’s 
extension of the first ILC moratorium that “the record before us simply 
does not establish that commercial affiliations present an undue risk to 
the [deposit insurance] fund,” and that “the comments [that the board of 
directors of the FDIC] received during the last six months have provided 
virtually no empirical evidence to support the proposition that commer-
cially owned ILCs are more risky than non-commercially owned 
ILCs.”167  He acknowledged that when reviewing ILC applications the 
FDIC “may take into account potential or hypothetical risk,” but also 
stated that “the very best evidence of risk in this area is the FDIC’s own 
[twenty]-year experience in supervising ILCs owned by commercial 
companies.”168 
Further, in a report created for the FDIC documenting the twenty-
one ILC failures over the past two decades, no data indicated that any 
ILC failed because of commercial affiliation.169  Similarly, the GAO 
Report noted that “from an operations standpoint, ILCs do not appear to 
have a greater risk of failure than other types of insured depository 
institutions.”170  As one industry analyst noted, failures of ILCs have not 
stemmed from commercial affiliations or the regulatory structure under 
which ILCs operate, but rather “from faulty strategic or tactical 
decisions.”171  Thus, like all other failed banks, the ILC failures resulted 
from bad management, not risky affiliation. 
The 2002 bankruptcy of Conseco, Inc (“Conseco”) is an excellent 
example.172 Conseco was primarily an insurance company until it ac-
quired Green Tree Financial Services (“Green Tree”) in 1998; the 
acquisition included Green Tree’s Utah ILC, which was later renamed 
 167. Dugan, supra note 154, at 3-4. 
 168. Id. at 3. 
 169. West, supra note 62, at 6-8. 
 170. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 24. 
 171. Christine E. Blair, The Future of Banking in America, The Mixing of Banking 
and Commerce: Current Policy Issues, 16 FDIC BANKING REV. 97, 114 (2004), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005jan/article3.pdf. 
 172. Bloomberg News, Conseco Makes Chapter 11 Filing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
2002, at C4. 
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Conseco Bank.173  Despite its parent’s financial troubles and impending 
insolvency, “Conseco Bank’s corporate firewalls and the regulatory 
supervision provided by Utah and the FDIC proved adequate.”174  The 
ILC was sold to GE Capital for its book value as part of the Conseco 
bankruptcy sale of assets.175  The Conseco Bank example illustrates the 
effectiveness of the FDIC’s regulatory supervision and demonstrates that 
ILCs can be steered clear of the financial troubles of their parent 
companies. 
ILC critics believe that “[t]he potential transfer of risks among in-
sured banks and uninsured commercial affiliates could result in inappro-
priate risk-taking, misallocation of resources, and uneven competitive 
playing fields in other industries.”176  Yet, while these critics continue to 
cite the potential risks resulting from commercial affiliation, these risks 
simply have not materialized over the twenty-year history of FDIC 
supervision.177 Conversely, as one author notes, evidence suggests that 
with adequate safeguards – corporate firewalls and regulatory super-
vision – “the careful mixing of banking and commerce can yield benefits 
without excessive risk.”178  Further refuting the threat of systemic risk 
and unfair competition posed by ILCs is the fact that “[a]t year-end 
2002, [ILCs] held just over $120 billion in assets.  This represent[ed] 
only 1.4 percent of the total assets held in all [FDIC] insured institu-
tions.”179  Thus, in terms of total market share and leverage, ILCs pose 
very little threat to the banking industry when considered as a whole. 
As the remarks of former FDIC Chairman Donald Powell 
 173. Jeff Bailey, Conseco Agrees to Acquire Green Tree – Exchange of Stock 
Valued At About $6.44 Billion; Cross-Selling Plays Role, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1998, at 
A2. 
 174. Blair, supra note 171, at 114. 
 175. Bloomberg News, Company News; Federal Judge Approves Sale of Conseco 
Finance, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2003, at C4 (“A Conseco lawyer said the total value of 
the deal was $1.37 billion.”); Blair, supra note 171, at 114 (noting that $323 million of 
the total amount received in the bankruptcy sale was for the ILC). 
 176. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 72. 
 177. See, e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INSUR. CORP., MANDATE FOR CHANGE: 
RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY (1987); Blair, supra note 171, at 115; Rose 
Marie Kushmeider, The U.S. Federal Financial Regulatory System: Restructuring 
Federal Bank Regulation, FDIC BANKING REV., 2005, at 1. 
 178. Blair, supra note 171, at 117. 
 179. Donald E. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Insur. Corp., Remarks Before the 
Conf. of State Bank Supervisors, The ILC Debate:  Regulatory and Supervisory Issues 
(May 23, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2003/pr5203.html. 
238 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
 
accurately highlight, “[the] risk posed by any depository institution 
depends on the appropriateness of the institution’s business plan and 
model, management’s competency to run the bank, the quality of the 
institution’s risk-management processes and, of course, the institution’s 
level of capital.”180  These are risk characteristics of every insured 
institution, not unique to commercially-affiliated ILCs.  Further, “[t]he 
FDIC believes the ILC charter, per se, poses no greater safety and 
soundness risk than other charter types.”181 
2. Distortion of Credit Allocation by Commercially-Affiliated ILCs 
The second rationale behind the separation of banking and 
commerce – e.g., greater potential for conflicts of interest and favoritism 
of affiliates – also appears to be founded on a protectionist ground.  A 
conflict of interest exists “whenever an entity that serves more than one 
interest is in a position to favor one of those interests over the 
other(s).”182  For example, an ILC “affiliated with a commercial firm 
may choose to deny loans to the affiliate’s competitors, may choose to 
lend preferentially to its commercial affiliate(s), or may illegally tie 
loans to purchases of the affiliate’s [goods or services].”183 
Notably, however, the FDIC has cited no conflict of interest that is 
unique to bank-commercial affiliations.184  Sections 23A185 and 23B186 
of the Federal Reserve Act apply to all FDIC-insured institutions and, 
among other things, restrict the amount and terms under which banks 
can lend to their affiliates.  Section 23B requires transactions between 
affiliates to be at arm’s length and on market terms, and must serve “to 
prohibit certain tying arrangements.”187  ILCs, like other supervised 
banking institutions, are thus restricted in the type and terms of credit 
they can extend to affiliates and must deal with them at arm’s length. 
These regulatory restrictions, when combined with entity-internal 
firewalls, demonstrate that the “principal potential conflicts [of interest] 
 180. Id. at 3. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Blair, supra note 171, at 102. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. at 103-04. 
 185. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2008). 
 186. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1. 
 187. Blair, supra note 171, at 103. 
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that are offered as a rationale for separating banking and commerce 
seem unlikely to pose significant risks to the safety and soundness of the 
bank or to the federal safety net.”188  As former FDIC Chairman Powell 
noted, “the firewalls and systems of governance safeguarding ILCs from 
misuse by their parent companies are, in many cases, more stringent 
than what exists in many affiliates of bank holding companies.”189  
Powell further stated that “[d]epending on the purpose and placement of 
the [ILC] within the organizational structure, mandated safeguards 
include: on-site management rather than management from distant 
corporate headquarters, independent boards of directors, strict guidelines 
to ensure arms-length transactions with the parent and other affiliates, 
and so on.”190  Lastly, and most importantly, “[r]efusing to lend to the 
competitors of its nonbank affiliates or granting credit to its affiliates . . . 
on favorable terms” runs counter to market forces because it “serves 
only to reduce bank income.”191 
3. Excessive Concentration of Resources from Conglomeration 
Between Banking and Commercial Entities 
Given Wal-Mart’s corporate statistics, it is easy to see why many 
ILC critics are intensely concerned with concentration of resources and 
Wal-Mart’s ability to first enter, then dominate, yet another market.  
Indeed, the conglomeration argument packs a fair punch, especially 
when combined with critics’ contentions under the conflict of interest 
argument addressed above.  When the BHC Act was enacted, the con-
cern was that the growth of unregulated bank holding companies could 
lead to “undue concentration of control in banking activities.”192  The 
BHC Act’s mission was two-fold: “preventing bank monopoly power 
from proliferating into nonbanking businesses, and discouraging the 
growth of large entities.”193 
However, once again, in today’s competitive banking market, this 
threat has failed to materialize. “Conglomerate integration – the combi-
nation of banks and nonbanks under a holding company” is unlikely to 
 188. Id. at 104. 
 189. Powell, supra note 179, at 3. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Blair, supra note 171, at 105. 
 192. Id. at 104 (quoting Stephen K. Halpert, The Separation of Banking and 
Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. Corp. L. 481, 500 (1988)). 
 193. Id. 
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result in monopoly rents because “markets for bank loans are competi-
tive.”  It is therefore difficult for a bank to extend market power to non-
banking lines of business.194  Moreover, “attempts by the bank to engage 
in predatory pricing,” (a practice in which Wal-Mart has been accused of 
engaging in other markets195) by cross-subsidizing the operations of its 
affiliates would work only if there were considerable barriers to entry 
into the banking market.196  In fact, however, although consolidation in 
banking has increased over the past decade, interstate banking and com-
petitive markets for small or community banks continue to make it 
unlikely that monopoly power will spread from banking to non-banking 
business. 
In sum, the arguments raised in support of the so-called policy197 
requiring the separation of banking and commerce ultimately lack factu-
al corroboration.  As the GAO Report candidly concedes, “generally the 
magnitudes of these risks [of mixing banking and commerce] are 
uncertain and may depend, in part, upon existing regulatory safeguards 
and how effectively banking regulators monitor and enforce these 
safeguards.”198  The issue lies, therefore, not within the industry but 
rather in the ability of regulation to ensure the safety and soundness of 
the institutions. 
4. Conclusion – Mixing of Banking and Commerce May Be Beneficial 
This banking and commerce debate is not new; neither is the related 
policy question facing lawmakers.  Twenty years ago the FDIC’s then-
Chairman L. William Seidman testified before Congress: “The pivotal 
question . . . is:  Can a bank be insulated from those who might misuse it 
or abuse it?  Is it possible to create a supervisory wall around banks that 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Fine, supra note 3, at 3. 
 196. Blair, supra note 171, at 105. 
 197. The separation of banking and commerce has merely been a function of the 
demands of the marketplace, level of technology, and the state of development of 
organization and business structures and that significant linkages between banking and 
commerce have existed and continue to exist despite regulation or prohibition.  See 
Leary Remarks, supra note 36, at 10 (noting that “[a]s the experience of the convention-
al banking industry shows, the wall separating banking and commerce is elastic” and 
has moved and changed over time). 
 198. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 71. 
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insulates them and makes them safe and sound, even from their owners, 
affiliates and subsidiaries?”199  If this analysis is correct, then the debate 
should focus on how affiliations should be regulated so that the public 
interest is met, i.e. to achieve the greatest possible good for the greatest 
possible number of individuals.  Regardless where one stands on how to 
best serve the “public interest”200, certainly the public interest can be 
determined only by considering both sides of the debate with respect to 
the ILC controversy. 
Industry observers have stated that there are many potential benefits 
from mixed banking and commerce.  First, cost efficiencies can result 
from economies of scale (when increasing the scale of operations lowers 
the average cost of production) or from economies of scope (when costs 
of production are lowered by the production of products that share 
inputs).201  Though these advantages may be difficult to support with 
concrete empirical data, they are evidenced by the heightened interest 
commercial entities have shown in owning banking institutions in recent 
years.  Second, “informational efficiencies” and product synergies may 
result from affiliation.202  For example, a bank with an equity position in 
a start-up company can use the position to acquire “information about, 
and the ability to exercise control over, the commercial firm.”203  Third, 
banking and commerce affiliation could also enhance the global compe-
titiveness of U.S. banks because “many other countries do not place 
similar restrictions on the affiliation of banks with commercial enti-
ties.”204  For evidence of these potential benefits, one need only look to 
the exponential growth of the ILC industry over the past decade.  More-
over, ILC industry advocates note that these potential savings and 
revenues may then be “passed on to consumers through lower prices for 
banking or commercial services.”205  Thus, it is the consumer who ul-
timately reaps the benefit of the commercial affiliation. 
In the media, these potential upsides to mixing banking and 
commerce go virtually unnoticed.  Nevertheless, they are essential to the 
 199. Leary Remarks, supra note 36, at 14. 
 200. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1625 (8th ed. 2004) (defining public welfare as 
“[s]ociety’s well-being in matters of health, safety, order, morality, economics, and 
politics”). 
 201. Blair, supra note 171, at 101; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 73. 
 202. Blair, supra note 171, at 101-02. 
 203. Id. at 101. 
 204. Id. at 102. 
 205. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 73. 
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debate.  When the benefits of ILC commercial affiliation are weighed 
against the opposition’s dearth of evidence of increased risk from 
commercial affiliation, the conclusion seems clear:  mixed banking and 
commerce as permitted by the ILC structure is neither a risk to the 
banking industry nor against public policy or the public interest.  Thus, 
the issue should not be whether ILCs create a greater risk to the safety 
and soundness of the banking industry.  Rather, the question should be 
that same question the FDIC asks with every deposit insurance 
applicant: can the risk of a particular ILC applicant be effectively 
managed by properly authorized regulators?206  Such a question should 
be answered on a case by case basis, as the FDIC and Utah DFI have 
successfully done for the past two decades.207 Deference should be given 
to regulators with experience and a long history of effective supervision. 
When asked to comment on Wal-Mart’s Utah ILC application, 
Sheldon Woods, President of the Association of Financial Services (the 
association representing ILCs), declined to comment on the application 
itself, but stated that “if the FDIC and the state of Utah can’t effectively 
manage the risk associated with any [ILC applicant], then that is where 
the question lies. . . .  If that risk cannot be effectively managed, then 
[the Association of Financial Services’s] position would be [that] we 
support the regulatory environment and [the particular ILC application] 
should not be approved.”208 
In the view of this author, Woods offers the best analysis to date.  If 
the FDIC were to conclude that the risks posed by a Wal-Mart ILC to 
both the banking institution and to the industry could not be effectively 
managed through FDIC and Utah DFI supervision, then that individual 
application should not be approved.  Congruently, an entire industry 
with a proven and stable regulatory track record209 should not be 
eliminated because the risk posed by one commercially-affiliated ILC 
cannot be effectively managed by the FDIC and Utah DFI. 
A decision to mix or to not mix banking and commerce by 
 206. See Blair, supra note 171, at 116-17.  Blair’s extensive analysis of the ILC 
industry concludes with a question:  “Does the mixing of banking and commerce 
constitute good public policy? The evidence suggests that the answer is a qualified yes:  
with adequate safeguards in place, the careful mixing of banking and commerce can 
yield benefits without excessive risk.”  Id. at 117. 
 207. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 208. Industry Outlook:  Banking & Finance, UTAH BUS., Mar. 2007, at 67, 72. 
 209. See supra Parts II.A.2(a), (b). 
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eliminating the ILC exception to the BHC Act should likewise not be a 
knee-jerk reaction.  It should not be made in response to national hosti-
lity or animosity toward Wal-Mart210 or a one-sided protectionist re-
action to appease lobbyists211 and constituents without actually weighing 
the issues and the impacts.  Ultimately, this is a public policy question 
that must be made by Congress and should result in whatever action is 
best for the public interest. 
The remainder of this Note is dedicated to the analysis of the 
formally proposed legislative amendments to the ILC exception from the 
BHC Act (and any similar proposed legislation that may be on the 
horizon) and the impact this legislation would have on the industry and 
Utah in particular. 
B. House Bill 698: The Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007 
On May 21, 2007, the House of Representatives voted by a margin 
of over ninety-six percent to pass House Bill 698.212  A look at the bill’s 
provisions reveals Congressional support for restricting the escalating 
growth of commercially-affiliated ILCs. 
House Bill 698 was a compromise on the issue of mixed banking 
and commerce, but it still would have banned future ILCs from being 
held by holding companies that are “commercial” in nature.213  In 
addition, it would have established the FDIC as the consolidated super-
visor of ILCs by granting it power equivalent to that of the Federal 
Reserve Board.214 Finally, House Bill 698 would have placed restric-
tions on grandfathered-in commercially-affiliated ILCs, prohibiting par-
ticipation in activities in which they did not partake in before January 
28, 2007 and barring the acquisition or establishment of any new 
banking branch.215  Each of these three provisions will be addressed 
 
 210. See, e.g., Is Wal-Mart Good For America?:  One, Two, Three, Four . . . We 
Don’t Want Your Superstore, PBS.org, Nov. 16, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/walmart/transform/protest.html; Bianco & Zellner, supra note 130; 
Wake-UpWal-Mart.com, The Real Facts About Wal-Mart, http://www.wakeupwalmart. 
com/facts/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
 211. See Fine, supra note 3, at 1. 
 212. H.R. Rep. No. 110-698, at 10 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. H5513 (daily ed. May 
21, 2007).  The vote consisted of 371 ayes and only sixteen nays, amongst whom all 
three Utah Congressmen were numbered.  Id. 
 213. H.R. 698 § 51(c)(2). 
 214. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 9 (2007). 
 215. H.R. 698 § 51(c)(4). 
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individually. 
ntent 
on c
ot chartered any new ILCs in over 
fifteen years.220  Thus, only Utah and Nevada would have been impacted 
by this aspect o
 
1. The “Commercial Bucket” 
House Bill 698 aimed to restrict ILC charters to holding companies 
deriving fifteen percent of gross, consolidated revenues from “non-
financial” activities.216  Thus, despite the lack of evidence of any excess 
risk created by ILC commercial affiliation, Congress appears to be i
ontinuing what it reaffirmed in 1999 under Gramm-Leach,217 by 
closing yet another door to the melding of banking and commerce. 
Only seven states charter entities identified as [ILCs] by the FDIC: 
Utah, California, Colorado, Minnesota, Hawaii, Indiana, and Nevada.218  
Of these seven states, Utah, Nevada, and Hawaii are the only states still 
chartering new ILCs controlled by commercial companies; Indiana no 
longer charters any new ILCs and “Minnesota, California, and Colorado 
no longer permit commercial companies to acquire or establish 
[ILCs].”219  Further, Hawaii has n
f House Bill 698.221 
(a)  Impact on the ILC Industry and Utah 
Any future legislation similar to House Bill 698 will immediately 
impact those commercial entities that either (i) did not get their ILC 
applications approved for FDIC deposit insurance before the grand-
fathering provisions of the legislation take effect, or (ii) had plans to file 
an ILC application with the FDIC but had not done so before the law’s 
enactment.  Among those companies with ILC applications pending 
 216. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 9. 
 217. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
 218. H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 9. 
 219. Id. at 9-10. 
 220. See id. at 10. 
 221. Aside from the extensive discussion on Utah’s ILC industry, it should also be 
noted that Nevada, home to Harley Davidson’s Eaglemark Savings Bank and Toyota’s 
Financial Savings Bank, has a growing ILC industry despite the relatively limited 
percentage of total ILC assets, and will likely be adversely impacted by House Bill 698.  
Valerie Miller, Industrial Strength:  ILC Banks Under Microscope, LAS VEGAS BUS. 
PRESS, Apr. 24, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.lvbusinesspress.com/articles/2006/ 
04/24/news/news03.txt. 
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uld result from conducting the entire transaction (from 
desig
ore, will 
not b
 
before the FDIC when the first moratorium was enacted in July 2006 – 
and which will most likely be banned by any “commercial bucket” – are: 
Wal-Mart; The Home Depot; Ford Motor Company; Berkshire 
Hathaway; DaimlerChrysler Corp.; Ceridian Corp.; CapitalSource, Inc.; 
Marlin Business Services Corp.; Cargill Financial Services; 
BlueCross/Blue Shield; Security National Master Holding Co.; Compu-
Credit; WESCOM Credit Union; and Cerberus.222  These corporations – 
unlike some of their competitors, such as automakers General Motors, 
BMW and Toyota – are therefore unable to yield the additional level of 
profits that wo
n to manufacturing to selling to financing) under the same corpo-
rate umbrella. 
ILCs controlled by financial holding companies, however, hold 
over ninety percent of ILC assets and deposits.223  Furthermore, while 
much has been said about the disproportionate concentration of re-
sources and monopolistic market control by commercial companies 
controlling an ILC, ILCs in general are home to only 1.4 percent of all 
FDIC-insured assets.224  The combination of these two statistics reveals 
that ILCs controlled by non-financial holding companies, i.e. commer-
cial entities, make up only one tenth of 1.4 percent of the total market 
for banking assets, or 0.14 percent.  The impact of any “commercial 
bucket” in future legislation mirroring House Bill 698, theref
e as significant for the ILC industry as a whole and the states that 
charter them as it is for the commercial companies themselves. 
The “commercial bucket” of House Bill 698 would have restricted 
charters in the state of Utah that were never granted by the FDIC in the 
first place due to the moratoria.225  Going forward, however, aside from 
the foregone jobs that would have developed in Utah as commercial 
companies received charters, the biggest impact of any future passage of 
legislation similar to House Bill 698 will likely befall those communities 
that benefit from the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”).226  
Darryle Rude, Supervisor of Industrial Banks for the Utah DFI, 
summarized “[t]he CRA is intended to encourage depository institutions 
 222. See Ford Joins Record ILC Parade, ICBA WASH. WKLY. REP., June 30, 2006, 
available at http://www.icba.org/publications/NewsletterDetailWWR.cfm?ItemNumber 
=22727&sn.ItemNumber=13783#n150712. 
 223. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-155; Sutton, supra note 26. 
 224. See Powell, supra note 179, at 2. 
 225. See infra Part III.B.2(a). 
 226. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006). 
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s through the CRA.  Any future 
limitations on the growth of the ILC industry will impact Utah’s 
communities a
necessary to ensure that the FDIC, once it 
became the consolidated regulator of ILCs, could supervise its banking 
institutions adeq
 
to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate, 
including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods” by requiring banks 
to contribute to their respective communities by either creating lending 
programs for low-income individuals or investing in municipal bonds, 
housing projects, or educational developments.227  ILCs are not exempt 
from the CRA and Utah is one of the few remaining states that continues 
to examine its banks for CRA compliance.228  Thus, Utah ILCs sub-
stantially contribute to their communitie
s well as its economy.229 
2. The FDIC as Consolidated Supervisor 
House Bill 698 would have granted the FDIC additional 
supervisory powers equivalent to those of the Federal Reserve230 and 
established the FDIC as the consolidated supervisor of ILC holding 
companies not already subject to consolidated regulation by another 
federal regulator.231  Such supervisory authority would have empowered 
the FDIC to require either a regulatory agency or a holding company 
that controls an ILC to provide any information necessary to: (1) assess 
the risk to the ILC, or (2) determine its condition.232  In tandem, the 
GAO Report “advocates that ILCs and their holding companies be 
regulated in a similar manner as other insured depository institutions and 
their holding companies.”233  Therefore, House Bill 698 would have 
implemented policy that the Federal Reserve Board and other industry 
observers championed as 
uately.234 
 227. Nolan, supra note 91, at 195; 12 C.F.R. § 563e.11(b) (2007). 
 228. Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, Supervisor of Indus. Banks, Utah DFI, 
in Salt Lake City, Utah (June 21, 2007).  The Utah DFI conducts its CRA compliance 
reviews between every three to five years.  Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 11. 
 231. H.R. 698 § 2(b); H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 9, 14. 
 232. H.R. 698 § 2(b); H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 17-18. 
 233. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 10. 
 234. See id. at 9. 
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the Utah DFI’s preexisting 
regulatory relationship with the FDIC, it is unlikely that its local 
examination pro u tly altered by a 
parallel provision in any future legislation. 
ng company or a non-bank subsidiary to terminate an 
activity or its ownership of the non-bank subsidiary if the activity or 
(a)  Impact on the ILC Industry and Utah 
The FDIC has repeatedly emphasized, and other industry analysts 
have chronicled, the FDIC’s proven supervisory track record indicating 
that the FDIC already possesses adequate supervisory power to regulate 
the risks of ILCs.235  Consequently, it is unclear what additional effects 
or restrictions House Bill 698’s proposed additional regulatory powers 
would have placed on ILCs.  In response to criticisms of the FDIC’s 
oversight of parent companies of ILCs, Powell stated that the FDIC can 
and does “visit the parent companies – and other affiliated entities, for 
that matter – to look over issues or operations that could impact the 
insured institution.  Congress has given [the FDIC] the power to protect 
the integrity of those relationships.  [The FDIC has] exercised that 
power . . . .”236  Thus, if the FDIC has already supervised ILC holding 
companies and their non-banking affiliates, it is unlikely that this 
provision of House Bill 698 would have had any significant impact on 
the ILC industry.  Moreover, because of 
ced res and operations will be significan
3. Activity and Branching Limitations 
The activity and branching limitations under House Bill 698 would 
have applied to commercially-affiliated ILCs grandfathered in under the 
legislation.237  First, these restrictions prevented a grandfathered-in com-
mercial ILC from engaging in any activities in which it was not engaged 
as of January 28, 2007.238  Second, a commercial ILC would not have 
been permitted to “acquire, establish, or operate any branch, deposit 
production office, loan production office, automated teller machine, or 
remote service unit in any State other than the home State of the [ILC]” 
unless the ILC had branched into that state prior to January 28, 2007.239  
Third, House Bill 698 would have authorized a federal supervisor to 
order a holdi
 
 235. See supra Part II.A.2(a). 
 236. Powell, supra note 179. 
. 698 § 51(f).  237. H.R
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
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ownership of th the depository 
institution.240 
polic
sumers, 
espe
 
e subsidiary represents a serious risk to 
(a) Impact on the ILC Industry and Utah 
These activity and branching limitations were a direct protection of 
community banks and were designed to prevent further expansion by 
ILCs – either through branching or marketing new products – into mar-
kets where, in Congress’s opinion, their presence is undesired.  Powell 
has quite accurately and succinctly stated, however, that “fear of compe-
tition should not be the compelling argument in formulating good public 
y.”241  Further, as the Utah DFI noted, placing restrictions on the 
activities of commercial ILCs “is unnecessary, anti-competitive, not in 
the best interest of consumers, and stifles innovation in the market 
place.”242 
The possible effects of any similar activity and branching limita-
tions in the future are important for both commercial ILCs and their 
customers.  Some of the major advantages to ILC ownership are the 
economies of scale and scope.243  The ability to offer a broader range of 
banking products and services to preexisting clients allows both the ILC 
holding company and the consumer to reap the savings benefits of 
convenience and efficiency.  Activity restrictions, on the contrary, pre-
vent marketplace ingenuity and diminish incentives for ILCs to develop 
improved products that better suit the needs of their con
cially as technology changes the future marketplace.  These restric-
tions, if passed in a future bill, will essentially freeze commercial ILCs 
while the rest of the banking industry moves forward and adapts its 
products and services to technological and economic advances. 
Additionally, the affiliates of a commercial ILC could also be 
restricted in the activities in which they are permitted to engage, or the 
ILC’s holding company could run the risk of divestment if the activity 
jeopardizes the safety and soundness of the banking institution.244  
 240. Id. 
 241. Powell, supra note 179, at 4. 
 242. UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., RESPONSE TO THE FDIC’S DECISION ON ITS 
MORATORIUM ON INDUSTRIAL LOAN CO. APPLICATIONS (Jan. 31, 2007), http://168.177. 
3 and accompanying text. 
228.15/newsrelease01%2D2007.htm. 
 243. See supra note 20
 244. H.R. 698 § 2(b). 
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iction on ILC 
holding companies and their affiliates could significantly impact an ILC 
holding company of whose business banking is only a minor portion.  
Further, activity limitations also run counter to overall holding company 
stabi
ly 
polit
a senior member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
While this type of activity limitation is precisely what the BHC Act 
proscribes for bank holding companies,245 such a restr
lity derived from broad diversification amongst subsidiaries. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the disastrous wake of the unprecedented string of corporate 
scandals and subsequent insolvencies culminated by the collapse of 
Enron in December 2001, Congress swiftly passed the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (“SOX”).246  In hindsight, the “hastily enacted and far-
reaching legislation and subsequent regulations, which carry major rami-
fications for business, productivity, and competitiveness” may ultimate-
ly carry costs which far outweigh their purported benefits.247  Not unlike 
SOX, House Bill 698 and any potential offspring proposed in Congress 
in the future would appear to follow the same reactionary legislative 
vein in response to the massive outcry to Wal-Mart’s ILC application: 
too much response for too small a problem.248  Although it is present
ically au courant to oppose all things Wal-Mart,249 the passage of 
House Bill 698 would have ultimately paralyzed the future growth of an 
industry that provides specialized and evolving financial products that 
are in demand by consumers in the marketplace. 
Nevertheless, House Bill 698 cleared only one of several legislative 
hurdles by being passed by the House.  Senator Bob Bennett (R-UT)250, 
 
 245. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Beverly Earle & Gerald E. Madek, The New World of Risk For Corporate 
Attorneys and Their Board Posts – Sarbanes-Oxley:  An Assessment of Impact and a 
Prescription For Action, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 185, 189 (2005). 
 247. Id.  A study has shown “that for companies with under $1 billion dollars in 
te that SOX was enacted without amendment by a vote of 
se Bill 698 passed the 
Senator Bob Bennett, http://www.senate.gov/~bennett/. 
revenue the costs of sustaining as a public company increased 130% through fiscal year 
2003.”  Id. at 218.  Further, “the survey showed that these costs appear to be continuing 
and may even be increasing.”  Id. 
 248. It is interesting to no
423-3 in the House and 99-0 in the Senate.  Id. at 189.  Hou
House with similar approval by a margin of 371 to sixteen.  See supra note 214. 
 249. See supra note 212. 
 250. 
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s and commercial holding companies.  Rather, ILCs 
should continue to receive FDIC insurance provided there is a sufficient 
regulatory framework to manage the risks inherent in the commerce and 
banking affiliation. 
 
 
Urban Affairs, 251 among others, will likely lead a charge aimed at 
toning down the unnecessarily over-reactive legislative impact of any 
future legislation paralleling House Bill 698.  By giving more deference 
to the supervisory success of the FDIC, the historic stability of 
commercially-affiliated ILCs and the benefits conferred upon consumers 
through the controlled mixing of banking and commerce, Congress will 
more accurately distinguish between hostility directed at Wal-Mart and 
the actual supervisory concerns and unmanaged risks created by ILCs 
generally and commercial ILCs specifically.  In the absence of any risk 
peculiar to commercially-affiliated ILCs, and in light of the regulatory 
success of the FDIC and Utah DFI, a wall of separation should not be 
erected between ILC
 251. See S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs Home Page, http://banking. 
senate.gov/public/index.cfm?fuseaction=information.membership (last visited June 23, 
2007). 
